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The paper addresses disruptive changes that globalization imposes on the 
geography of innovation systems, and identifies potential benefits that developing 
countries could reap from international linkages. The analysis is centered on three 
propositions. First, developing countries need to blend diverse international and domestic 
sources of knowledge to compensate for initially weak national production and 
innovation systems. Second, a greater variety of international knowledge linkages is 
possible, as globalization reduces the spatial stickiness of innovation. Third, globalization 
has culminated in an important organizational innovation: the spread of global production 
networks (GPN) combines concentrated dispersion with systemic integration, creating 
new opportunities for international knowledge diffusion. We argue that GPN provide 
firms and industrial districts in developing countries with new opportunities for reverse 
knowledge outsourcing. We explore resultant challenges that define the need for public 
policy response, define the new agenda for industrial upgrading, and discuss what types 
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Evolutionary and structuralist theories (as defined by Lipsey in this issue) have 
reached a certain level of maturity. Basic principles are now well established within the 
economics profession: a focus on learning and innovation as a major source of economic 
growth is no longer a minority position. Some key concepts are beginning to shape policy 
debates in the OECD, the World Bank, and the European Commission ( e.g., OECD, 
1999). It is time to move beyond the defense of basic principles to a policy-oriented 
research agenda.  
 
The paper suggests that some complementary work is needed to the systemic view 
of innovation dynamics and policy responses to technological change. The focus is on 
national innovation system (NIS) theory
1, simply because it addresses most directly our 
concern of “integrating policy perspectives into research on technology and economic 
growth.” (Bartzokas and Teubal, in this issue). Despite its impressive achievements, this 
theory has two important weaknesses that frustrate an effective implementation of 
technology policy in developing countries: it fails to address the disruptive changes 
imposed by globalization on the geography of innovation systems; it also fails to identify 
potential benefits that developing countries could reap from international linkages.  
 
Three propositions are used to correct these weaknesses. In part 1, we argue that 
developing countries need to blend diverse international and domestic sources of 
knowledge to compensate for initially weak national production and innovation systems. 
The challenge is to integrate this proposition explicitly into innovation system theory. The 
bulk of the paper develops our second proposition: a greater variety of international 
knowledge linkages is possible, due to the spatial impact of globalization (parts 2 and 3). 
This runs counter to much of the established wisdom on the geography of innovation 
(2.1.): a central proposition of the latter literature is that knowledge is spatially sticky: 
innovation and inter-active learning require co-location. In part 2.2., we reconsider the 
agglomeration economies argument, and ask how it needs to be revised in light of the 
impact of globalization. We highlight the puzzle of concentrated dispersion: 
agglomeration economies continue to matter, yet their spatial stickiness has been reduced 
(2.3.); introduce the flagship model of concentrated dispersion (2.4.), and explore why 
agglomeration propensities differ ( 2.5.). 
 
In part 3, we argue that globalization has culminated in an important 
organizational innovation: the spread of global production networks (GPN) combines 
concentrated dispersion with systemic integration, creating new opportunities for 
international knowledge diffusion. We first describe key features of systemic integration: 
an increasing scope of international linkages (3.1.), and a growing intensity of such 
                                                            
1 Important sources include: Freeman, 1987, 1995 and 1997; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Boyer et al, 
1997; and Edquist, 1997. Mowery and Nelson, 1999 provides a complementary perspective on sectoral 
innovations systems. For attempts to apply this concept to developing countries, see Shin, 1998, Gu, 1999; 
and Ernst and Lundvall, 2000).  2   
linkages (3.2.). We then highlight the capacity of GPN to enhance international 
knowledge diffusion ( 3.3.) and discuss possible constraints (3.4.). 
 
Finally, in part 4, we pursue this issue from a developing country´s perspective. 
We argue that GPN provide new opportunities for reverse knowledge outsourcing for 
firms and industrial districts in developing countries (4.1.), explore resultant challenges 
that define the need for public policy response (4.2.), define the new agenda for industrial 
upgrading (4.3.), and discuss what types of policies and support institutions may help to 
reap the benefits from network participation (4.4.).We emphasize that nothing is 
automatic about these processes: the key to success are institutions that facilitate the 
concurrent leveraging of multiple and diverse sources of knowledge - the global 
production networks of buyers and suppliers of both foreign and domestic origins, as well 
as the diverse carriers of national innovation systems. Equally important is that the nature 
and composition of such linkages needs to change over time as a country moves up the 
technological ladder. 
 
1. BEYOND NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS (NIS): BLENDING 
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE  
1.1.  Achievements of NIS Theory 
 
The concept of “national innovation systems” (NIS) is an attempt to analyze the 
institutional determinants of learning, knowledge creation and innovation. A basic 
proposition is that innovation is crucial for economic growth and welfare, and that it is an 
inter-active and socially embedded process. A second characteristic is a focus on the 
national economy: peculiar features of economic structures and institutions offer quite 
distinct possibilities for learning and innovation, and hence shape the technological (or 
economic) performance of a country. The economic structure determines specialization 
(i.e. the product mix) and learning requirements (the breadth and depth of the knowledge 
base). Institutions, on the other hand, shape learning efficiency: they define how things 
are done and how learning takes place. An important concern is the “congruence” 
(Freeman, 1997:13) of different subsystems, which is necessary to create a virtuous rather 
than a vicious circle. 
 
The strengths of this concept are well established: by bringing technical change 
and institutional change back into the analysis as key explanatory variables, it has given 
new life to the discourse on economic growth. A systemic view of innovation dynamics 
has moved the analysis beyond the “internalist” bias that characterizes much of the 
literature on industrial organization and the theory of the firm
2. This internalist bias has 
its roots in Edith Penrose`s observation that “... a firm´s rate of growth is limited by the 
                                                            
2 Two versions of the internalist bias can be distinguished. Teece (1998: 148) highlights a focus on internal 
hierarchical control: “Economists, as well as many organization theorists, have traditionally thought of 
firms as islands of hierarchical control embedded in a market structure and interacting with each other 
through the price mechanism.” A second version of the internalist bias relates specifically to innovation: 
capability-based theories of the firm have focused primarily on the internal accumulation of knowledge and 
skills which underpins its productive activity
 (Coombs and Metcalfe (1998).  3   
growth of knowledge within it”, which has drastically changed our perception of how 
firms develop and compete
3. 
 
One way to overcome this internalist bias is to ask how firms organize inter-
organizational linkages, especially with regard to knowledge creation. Lundvall (1992) 
highlights the interactive nature of innovation and documents how user-producer 
interaction and other forms of inter-firm cooperation give rise to a national system of 
innovation. And Coombs and Metcalfe (1998:3) have convincingly argued that 
competitive success depends on a firm´s ability to manage inter-organizational knowledge 
creation: “The creation of new capabilities is increasingly taking place through the 
combination of the capabilities of several firms and research organizations.“ Cross-
organizational coordination of capability formation thus becomes of critical importance
4.  
 
1.2. Neglect of the International Dimension 
 
Yet there are also important weaknesses that we need to address to broaden the 
acceptance of innovation system theory, and to improve its policy relevance. An 
important weakness is a neglect of the international dimension
5. NIS theory uses two 
propositions to defend its focus on national linkages: First, globalization increases the 
need for strong national innovation systems. Second, interactive learning requires close 
interaction between co-located users and producers; national linkages are thus likely to be 
more effective than international linkages.  
 
We agree with the first proposition: a strong and specialized innovation system is 
of critical importance in a globalizing world; diversity and specialization are the keys to 
sustained growth (e.g., Ernst and O´Connor, 1989). For policy purposes, it obviously 
makes sense to start with a focus on the national innovation system. This is in line with 
the current shift in the concept of development strategy away from a blind faith in 
markets, emphasizing privatization, deregulation, and trade liberalization to a debate on 
making both public and corporate governance more effective (e.g., Rodrik, 2000). 
 
From a developing country´s policy perspective however, it is problematic to 
argue that national linkages are more effective than international linkages. This 
                                                            
3 Penrose, 1959/1995, Foreword, 3d edition, “The Theory of the Growth of the Firm”, pages XVI and XVII. 
Ironically, this internalist bias is probably one of the few things that capability-based theories of the firm 
share with the more traditional proponents of the economics of organization. Take transaction cost 
economics. Williamson (1998) himself acknowledges that it is necessary to push the analysis “…beyond the 
generic level at which it now operates” (p. 15) to consider “… the strengths and weaknesses of a particular 
firm in relation to its rivals” (p.29), peculiar characteristics of market niches and the overall “strategic 
situation” (table 1). 
4 This is in line with population level learning theory (Miner and Haunschild, 1995) which shows that 
organizational learning depends in important ways on the interaction of organizations, as opposed to 
feedback from trial and error events inside the organization. 
5 This constitutes a common weakness of economic theories of innovation and the firm: “…most of the 
work of scholars from these disciplines has not generally embraced an international dimension and, as a 
result, our understanding of the way resources are organized and distributed across national boundaries has 
been constricted.” (Dunning, 1998, p.291)  4   
proposition is based on the (mostly implicit) assumption that a fairly homogeneous 
industry structure can be taken for granted: “… the nation contains a broad set of 
advanced producers and possible ´lead users´ ” (Andersen, 1992, note 6). In other words, 
it is assumed that no huge productivity differences exist, and that there is a strong local 
base of support industries. This in turn implies the existence of a broad local knowledge 
base that local firms can access. 
 
This assumption however does not hold universally
6. It excludes developing 
countries and most NIEs and second-tier OECD countries, as one of their primary 
features is a narrow and incomplete set of domestic linkages (e.g, Lall, 1997; Ernst, 
Ganiatsos, and Mytelka, 1998). A basic characteristic is a dualistic industry structure, 
with widely diverging productivity levels, with technologically advanced firms (mostly 
foreign MNE affiliates) producing for export alongside weaker domestic firms importing 
CKD parts for screw driver assembly of products to be sold in the domestic market. We 
also find a narrow local knowledge base, and a very weak local base of support industries. 
Very limited sharing and pooling of resources occurs within the country, and often even 
within the export-oriented cluster.  
 
1.3. Innovation Systems in Developing Countries 
 
More specifically, developing countries share four basic features which are not 
well accounted for in NIS theory: highly heterogeneous economic structures constrain 
agglomeration economies; weak and unstable economic institutions obstruct learning 
efficiency; a limited domestic knowledge base implies that developing countries must 
access and use external sources of knowledge; and a high vulnerability to volatile global 
currency and financial markets constrain patient capital that is necessary for the 
development of a broad domestic knowledge base. Initially at least, these countries thus 
have few opportunities to build their innovation systems on localized clusters. For quite 
some time, they have to rely primarily on foreign sources of knowledge as the main 
vehicle of learning and capability formation. In short, international linkages need to 
prepare the way for the development of national innovation systems.  
 
Empirical research has shown that, as a developing country progresses in its 
industrial transformation, it reliance on international technology sourcing and knowledge 
linkages has substantially increased (e.g., Ernst and O´Connor, 1989; Hobday, 1995; Lall, 
1997; and Ernst, Ganiatsos, and Mytelka, 1998). A peculiar feature of its innovation 
system is a heavy integration into a variety of firm-specific regional and global 
production networks (e.g., Ernst, 1994b, OECD; Ernst and Ravenhill, 1999; and Borrus, 
Ernst and Haggard, 2000). 
 
The Korean way of building its innovation system in the electronics industry is 
emblematic for a heavy reliance on international linkages, combined with the 
                                                            
6 Much of the agglomeration economies argument has been developed for a handful for highly developed 
clusters, such as Silicon Valley, Route 128,  Northern Italy, Baden Wuerttemberg, and some industrial 
districts in Nordic countries.  5   
development of complementary domestic linkages (Ernst, 1994a, and 2000b)
7. The 
government encouraged some of the leading chaebol to focus on learning and knowledge 
accumulation through a variety of links with foreign equipment and component suppliers, 
technology licensing partners, OEM clients and minority joint venture partners. By 
licensing well-proven foreign product designs and by importing most of the production 
equipment and the crucial components, Korean electronics producers were able to focus 
most of their attention on three areas:  i) the mastery of production capabilities, initially 
for assembly, but increasingly for related support services and for mass production; ii) 
some related minor change capabilities, ranging from "reverse engineering" techniques to 
"analytical design" and some "system engineering" capabilities that are required for 
process re-engineering and product customization; and iii) a capacity to ramp up new 
production lines quickly and at low cost. 
 
In order to succeed, Korean firms had to develop the knowledge and skills that are 
necessary to monitor, unpackage, absorb and upgrade foreign technology.  Equally 
important was a capacity to mobilize the substantial funds for paying technology 
licensing fees and for importing "best practice" production equipment and leading-edge 
components.
8  Most Korean producers arguably would have hesitated to pursue such 
high-cost, high-risk strategies had they not been induced to do so by a variety of selective 
policy interventions by the Korean state. By providing critical externalities such as 
information, training, maintenance and other support services, and finance, the Korean 
government has fostered the growth of firms large enough to overcome high entry 
barriers. 
 
It is this co-evolution of international and domestic knowledge linkages that 
explains Korea´s extraordinary success. It has enabled Korean firms to reverse the 
sequence of technological capability formation (Dahlman, Ross-Larson and Westphal, 
1987). Rather than proceeding from innovation to investment to production, they focused 
on the ability to operate production facilities according to competitive cost and quality 
standards.  Through "reverse engineering" and other forms of copying and imitating 
foreign technology and by integrating into the increasingly complex global production 
networks of American, Japanese and some European global corporations (the network 
flagships), Korean firms were able to avoid the huge cost burdens and risks involved in 
R&D and in developing international distribution channels.
  
 
In short, international linkages provided an important initial catalyst for the 
development of domestic capabilities. The latter have substantially benefited from 
knowledge outsourcing through gradually more sophisticated international linkages. A 
theory of innovation systems needs to focus on this blending of domestic and 
international knowledge linkages. This raises an important question: Will globalization 
act as a carrier or barrier for such a dynamic coupling? 
                                                            
7 Taiwan provides another, albeit very different approach to the development of NIS through international 
linkages (Ernst, 2000a). 
8 Already in the 1970s, most Korean electronics firms had to pay on average roughly 3% of their sales for 
technology licensing fees, a share which since then has increased to more than 12%.   6   
 
2.  GLOBALIZATION AND THE MOBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE  
 
2.1. Established Wisdom: Spatial Stickiness of Knowledge 
 
The question how globalization affects the geographic dispersion of knowledge 
and innovation, and whether this fosters or constrains local capability formation has 
played an important role for theoretical debates on the role of FDI and multinational 
corporations (e.g., Cantwell, 1994; Dunning, 1998). More recently, this question has also 
received attention in innovation theory, the theory of the firm, and economic geography 
(e.g. Chandler et al, 1998). 
 
The dominant position has been that innovation, in contrast to most other stages 
of the value chain, is highly immobile: it remains tied to specific locations, despite a rapid 
geographic dispersion of markets, finance and production (e.g., Archibugi and Michie, 
1997). The main reason for such spatial stickiness is the inter-active nature of innovation 
(Kline and Rosenberg 1986; Lundvall, 1988): it requires dense knowledge exchange 
between users and producers, much of it being tacit knowledge. Such information-rich 
transfers require localized clusters within a nation, or even better, an industrial district, or 
micro- region (e.g., Porter, 1990; Lundvall, 1992;  Saxenian, 1994; Storper, 1997; and 
Markusen, 1996). This reflects the importance of “dynamic agglomeration economies”: 
co-location facilitates a continuous, intense and rapid exchange of new ideas about 
technical, organizational and production improvements. 
 
Knowledge and innovation thus do not easily migrate across borders: they do not 
automatically follow, once production moves. If true, this would imply that even while 
globalization extends its reach beyond trade and finance, giving rise to an extensive 
relocation of production, this may not help to reduce the huge international gaps in 
knowledge and innovation. For industrial countries, the spatial stickiness of innovation 
may foster attempts to sustain their technological superiority. For developing countries 
however, spatial stickiness of innovation may fundamentally constrain their sources of 
growth, and hence perpetuate global inequality. 
 
Our second proposition qualifies this argument. We argue that globalization has 
created an explosive mix of forces that facilitate international knowledge diffusion, 
increasing the variety of international knowledge linkages. This creates new opportunities 
and challenges for the development of innovation systems. 
 
2.2. Reconsidering the Agglomeration Economies Argument 
 
Proximity exerts a powerful constraining effect on the location of economic 
activities: industries tend to agglomerate and cluster in particular geographic locations, 
giving rise to persistent patterns of national and regional specialization. Alfred Marshall´s 
pioneering concept of “externalities” (1890/1916) helps to identify both static and 
dynamic economies of agglomeration. While static agglomeration economies focus on  7   
efficiency  gains resulting from scale economies, transaction and transport costs, and 
input-output linkages, dynamic agglomeration economies highlight the central role of 
learning and knowledge creation. Marshall emphasizes three advantages of an industrial 
district: i) it provides a pool of skilled workers with industry-specific capabilities; ii) 
intermediate inputs, especially non-tradable ones, are provided by local suppliers; and iii) 
there is a continuous, intense and rapid exchange of new ideas about technical, 




Marshall´s important observations have been forgotten for a long time: neo-
classical economists have neglected until recently the agglomeration or clustering of 
related activities. Since Krugman (1991, 1995), economic geography has been re-
established as a respectable topic. This has brought back into economic theory 
“increasing returns” and other anomalies like the “path dependency” of spatial location. 
Unfortunately, these debates have remained trapped in the static efficiency paradigm and 
miss the importance of knowledge and learning
10.  
 
There is however now a growing literature that analyzes the dynamics of spatial 
agglomeration. It is argued that clustering effects are particularly important for knowledge 
externalities and spill-overs (Porter, 1990; Enright, 1998; Spender, 1998; Porter and 
Sølvell, 1998; OECD, 1999c). Concentrations of companies succeed when they cooperate 
as well as compete; the focus of cooperation is on the sharing of knowledge, skills and 
technologies among the companies and with public agencies.  
 
Dynamic agglomeration economies are considered to be an important determinant 
of firm behavior. Resources and capabilities that are critical for a firm´s competitive 
success “can often be found inside a region, rather than within any single firm”; 
“…regional clusters often involve activities that are shared across firms within the 
cluster” (Enright, 1998: pages 315 and 316). A regional cluster provides access to specific 
resources and capabilities that are difficult to reproduce otherwise; it enables a firm to 
engage in peculiar types of coordination and organization; and it allows the firm to share 
activities with other cluster participants (ibid, pages 328-336). In short, the “… notion 
that resources can be specific to a region rather than a firm lies at the heart of many of the 
major explanations for localization in industry. In regional clusters, tacit knowledge can 
be internal to an area, without being internal to any specific firm. Such knowledge can be 
                                                            
9 “…(P)eople following the same skilled trade get ….(substantial advantages)..from near neighbourhood to 
one another. The mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but are as it were in the air, and children learn 
many of them unconsciously. Good work is rightly appreciated, inventions and improvements in machinery, 
in processes and the general organization of the business have their merits promptly (DE) discussed: if one 
man starts a new idea, it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions of their own; and thus it 
becomes the source of new ideas.” (ibid, p.271) 
10 For Krugman ( 1991), agglomeration in essence results from three factors: i) substantial increasing 
returns to scale - both at the level of the single firm (internal economies) and the industry (external 
economies). ii) sufficiently low transport costs; and iii) large local demand. Proximity matters, resulting in 
agglomeration, once these three factors interact. For an excellent critique of  the “New `Geographical` Turn 
in Economics”, see Martin, 1999  8   
tradeable locally without being tradeable outside the regional cluster (italics added, DE). 
“ (ibid., 326) 
 
Attempts to construct a neo-Marshallian agglomeration theory are a positive 
development, as long as we remain conscious of some inherent limitations. It is not 
possible to use this concept today without substantial changes
11. We need an explicit 
analysis of the impact of globalization on agglomeration economies and on international 
knowledge diffusion. Research on globalization has clearly established that the centre of 
gravity has shifted beyond the national economy. Cross-border linkages proliferate, with 
the result that no country can exist any longer in isolation. The same is true for regions 
and industrial districts: they are rapidly becoming internationalized, and increasingly 
depend on international linkages  (Dunning, 1998) to import key inputs and to export 
outputs. Such external linkages cover both tangibles  like materials and machinery, and 
intangibles like finance and knowledge. A significant increase in the share of the latter is 
an important distinguishing feature of current rounds of globalization.  
 
Globalization thus poses some important puzzles that need to be addressed in a 
revised agglomeration theory: Why is it that, despite the advantages of co-location, there 
has been a massive geographic dispersion of certain stages of the value chain? More 
specifically, what factors explain that some value chain activities are more prone to 
geographic dispersion, while others are more sticky? How come that agglomeration 
economies are no longer restricted to the home country basis? What makes it possible to 
reproduce certain co-location effects at overseas locations? And what explains the 
creation of dense cross-border linkages between these locations that facilitate cross-
border knowledge diffusion? 
 
2.3. The Puzzle of Concentrated Dispersion 
 
Despite the fundamental advantages of keeping production at home and at close 
proximity, geographic dispersion has occurred on a massive scale. This reflects a shift in 
the carriers of globalization: while intra-industry trade dominated till the mid-1980s, 
since then, international production has grown considerably faster than international trade 
(e.g., UNCTAD, 1998). By the 1990s, sales of foreign affiliates of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) far outpaced exports as the principal vehicle to deliver goods and 
services to foreign markets.  
 
In contrast to the assumptions of convergence theory, globalization does not lead 
to the wonderland of a “borderless world” (Ohmae, 1991) where capital, knowledge and 
other resources move freely around the globe, acting as a powerful force of 
                                                            
11 After all, Marshall´s analysis was shaped by value judgments which reflect a peculiar historical concern 
of late 19
th century Britain (Lazonick, 1999, pages 10 passim): Will Britain be able to survive the new and 
aggressive competition from emerging nations such as the US and Germany, with their highly concentrated 
industries? Marshall believed that “a proliferation of small-scale proprietary enterprises was both a morally 
superior form of industrial organization and more favorable to economic development. … The implication 
was that economic development did not require concentrations of power within industry, like in the US and 
Germany.  9   
equalization
12. Globalization does not rescind the gravitational forces of geography. It has 
given rise to “ever more finely grained patterns of locational differentiation and 
specialization” (Scott, 1998: 399). Inequality and diversity prevail. A breath-taking speed 
of geographic dispersion has been combined with spatial concentration: much of the 
recent cross-border extension of manufacturing and services has been concentrated on a 
handful of specialized local clusters, both within the Triad and some so-called emerging 
economies, especially in East Asia.  
 
Let us look at some indicators in the electronics industry, a pace setter of 
globalization (Ernst, 1998). A good proxy of geographic dispersion are the growing 
methodological problems that one encounters when one tries to determine the importance 
of individual countries and regions in the world electronics market. The difficulties 
reflect the fact that final products, almost without exception, involve substantial inputs 
across the value chain that are produced in diverse locations across the globe. 
 
Two measures exist: one is based on company ownership, the other on the country 
of origin of exports. Both market share measures were largely similar, as long as trade 
was the most important vehicle for international market share expansion. Both indicators 
however began to diverge, once production dispersed across borders. Take 
semiconductors (Reed Electronics Research, 1998): there is a huge gap between the US 
share of world exports (18%) and its market share based on company ownership (32%). 
This suggests that a very high share of US production is taking place overseas. The gap 
between ownership-based and export market shares is even higher for Asia (38% by 
country of origin, versus 19% by ownership), which suggests that Asia has attracted the 
bulk of investments not only from the US but also from Japan and Europe.  
 
Geographic dispersion however is heavily  concentrated in a few specialized local 
clusters. For instance, the supply chain of a computer company typically spans different 
time zones and continents, and integrates a multitude of transactions and local clusters.  
The degree of dispersion differs across the value chain: it increases, the closer one gets to 
the final product, while dispersion remains concentrated especially for critical precision 
components.  
 
On one end of the spectrum is final PC assembly that is widely dispersed to major 
growth markets in the US, Europe and Asia. A good example is provided by Taiwan´s 
Acer group, one of Asia´s role models of how a small company can rapidly grow and 
transform itself into a global competitor
13. Out of Acer´s 21 manufacturing sites, six are 
large volume manufacturing sites located overseas: two in China, and one each in the 
Philippines, Malaysia, Mexico and Wales. Equally important are Acer`s 19 overseas final 
assembly and configuration centers that are much more geographically dispersed to major 
                                                            
12 For a critique, see Boyer, 1996; and Ernst and Ravenhill, 1999 
13 From humble origins, Acer has grown within less than two decades into a global network flagship that 
employs more than 32,000 people in 120 enterprises in 37 countries, supporting dealers and distributors in 
over 100 countries. Acer Group revenues in 1998 were US$ 6.7 billion (acer.com)  10   
markets. Adding further complexity, Acer needs to integrate its networks into the GPN of 
major OEM customers, like IBM (its largest customer). 
 
Dispersion is still quite extended for standard, commodity-type components 
(homogeneous products in the parlance of industrial economists), but less so than for 
final assembly. For instance, keyboards, computer mouse devices and power switch 
supplies are sourced from many different sources, both in Asia, Mexico and the European 
periphery, with Taiwanese firms playing a major role as supply coordinators. The same is 
true for lower-end printed circuit boards. Concentration of dispersion increases, the more 
we move toward more complex, capital-intensive precision components: memory devices 
and displays are sourced primarily from Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore; and hard 
disk drives from a Singapore-centered triangle of locations in Southeast Asia. Finally, 
dispersion becomes most concentrated for high-precision, design-intensive components 
that pose the most demanding requirements on the mix of capabilities that a firm and its 
cluster needs to master: microprocessors for instance are sourced from a few globally 
dispersed affiliates of Intel, two secondary American suppliers, and one recent entrant 
from Taiwan, Via Technologies.  
 
The hard disk drive (HDD) industry provides another example both for the breath-
taking speed of geographic dispersion, as well as for its spatial concentration (Ernst, 
1997b) Until the early 1980s, almost all HDD production was concentrated in the U.S., 
with limited additional production facilities in Japan and Europe. Today, only 1 percent 
of the final assembly of HDDs has remained in the US, while Southeast Asia dominates 
with almost 70% of world production, based on units shipped. Slightly less than half of 
the world´s disk drives come from Singapore, with most of the rest of the region´s 
production being concentrated in Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. 
 
2.4. The Flagship Model of Concentrated Dispersion 
 
One major impact of globalization has been the spread of global production 
networks (GPN) that provide international corporations (the network flagships) with 
quick access to lower-cost capabilities overseas that are complementary to their own core 
competencies. This reflects the rising cost of innovation (OECD, 2000: chapter 2). 
Flagships are also under increasing pressure to exploit complementarities that result from 
the systemic nature of knowledge (Antonelli, 1998). We thus need to shift the focus of 
our analysis away from the industry and the individual firm to the level of a network 
flagship and its evolving GPN. This distinguishes our approach from earlier research on 
international technology transfer through stand-alone foreign direct investment projects of 
multinational corporations (e.g., Enos, 1989). 
 
Take again the hard disk drive industry. Seagate, the current industry leader 
provides a good example of the flagship model of concentrated dispersion (Ernst, 1998). 
Today, Seagate operates 22 plants worldwide: 14 of these plants, i.e. 64% of the total, are 
located in Asia. Asia's share in Seagate's worldwide production capacity, as expressed in 
sq-ft, has increased from roughly 35% in 1990 to slightly more than 61% in 1995 - an  11   
incredible speed of expansion. Concentrated dispersion is also reflected in the regional  
breakdown of Seagate's employment. Asia's share increased from around 70% in 1990 to 
more than 85% in 1995.  
 
The fact that Asia's share in employment is substantially higher than its share in 
capacity, while the opposite is true for the US, indicates a clear-cut division of labor: 
volume manufacturing and the production of low- and mid-range components has been 
shifted to Asia, while the US retains the high-end, knowledge-intensive stages of the 
value chain, especially hard-core R&D. It is this network-specific division of labor that 
determines distinct development trajectories for specialized industrial clusters in the US 
and in Developing Asia. 
 
We need to add a further aspect: an extreme spatial concentration within East 
Asia. Slightly more than 92% of Seagate's capacity in Asia is concentrated in three 
locations: in Bangkok (almost 32%), Penang (more than 30%) and Singapore (a bit less 
than 30%). And almost 50% (26,000 out of 55,000) of Seagate's Asian employment is 
concentrated in its plant in the outskirts of Bangkok. This indicates that network 
specialization also defines the development opportunities of industrial districts within a 
particular macro-region. Bangkok is the centre for low labor cost volume manufacturing. 
Next comes Singapore with more than 27% (15,000), substantially more than Malaysia's 
16% (9,000 people). For both Singapore and Malaysia, the low ratio of employment 
relative to its share in Seagate's production capacity indicates that production facilities 
have been rapidly automated and include now higher-end manufacturing activities such as 
component manufacturing. 
 
Over time, Seagate has developed a quite articulate regional division of labor in 
East Asia. Bottom-end work is done in Indonesia and China. Malaysian and Thai plants 
make components and specialize in partial assembly. Singapore is the centre of gravity of 
this regional production network: its focus is on higher-end products and some important 
coordination and support functions. It completes the regional production network, by 
adding testing, which requires precision. This indicates that for individual specialized 
industrial clusters, development trajectories are path-dependent. 
 
In short, rapid cross-border dispersion coexists with agglomeration. Globalization 
often occurs as an extension of national clusters across national borders. This implies two 
things: First, some stages of the value chain are internationally dispersed, while others 
remain concentrated. And second, the internationally dispersed activities typically 
congregate in a limited number of overseas clusters. This clearly indicates that 
agglomeration economies continue to matter, hence the path-dependent nature of 
development trajectories. What needs to be explained however is how they have changed 
under the impact of globalization. There is a growing literature that explains the 
bifurcation of geographic location patterns along functional activities (Audretsch and 
Feldman, 1996, McKendrick et al, 2000) or value-chain stages (Dicken, 1992; Ernst, 
1997b).   12   
The essential point is that such distinctions should be made not on the basis of 
different industries, but rather for different value chain stages.Earlier research has been 
based on a distinction between low-wage, low-skill  sun-set industries and high-wage, 
high-skill sunrise industries. Such simple dichotomies however have failed to produce 
convincing results, for two reasons: First, there are low-wage, low-skill value stages in 
even the most high-tech industry, and high-wage, high-skill activities exist even in so-
called traditional industries like textiles (Ernst, Ganiatsos and Mytelka, 1998). Second, 
both the capability requirements and the boundaries of a particular “industry” keep 
changing over time, which makes an analytical focus on the industry level even more 
problematic. 
 
2.5. Diverse Agglomeration Propensities 
 
Concentrated dispersion thus raises an important question: What factors explain 
that some value-chain activities are more prone to geographic dispersion, while others are 
more prone to proximity constraints? The usual suspects of course are differences in labor 
costs and knowledge-intensity. There is a strong presumption that high-wage and more 
knowledge-intensive activities are more prone to agglomeration effects, and hence 
resistant to geographic dispersion. By the same token, geographic dispersion can be 
expected to be most prominent for low-wage, and low-skill value chain activities. 
 
There is nothing surprising about these propositions - this is precisely what one 
would expect from an agglomeration economies perspective. This would seem to imply 
that a clear-cut separation is possible between low-end activities that are highly dispersed, 
and knowledge-intensive ones that require localized clusters. Yet, reality is considerably 
more messy. An important complication results from the diversity of agglomeration 
propensities: co-location requirements differ across industries and product markets; they 
also differ across firms. Those industry and firm-specific differences provide one possible 
explanation for the diversity of development trajectories. 
 
Take first industry-specific features: co-location becomes more important, the 
greater an industry`s volatility, i.e. the shorter its product-life cycle, the quicker the 
required speed-to-market, and the greater the number of design changes. Yet, such co-
location can occur at different places. This is borne out by the example of the hard disk 
drive industry. Due to its high volatility, HDD assemblers cannot afford to have a 
geographically extended supply chain. Hence the importance for suppliers to locate close 
to the main drive assemblers (Ernst, 1997b; McKendrick et al, 2000). During the early 
stages of this industry, this implied co-location at home (primarily around IBM´s San José 
facility in California). We have seen that globalization has given rise to the concentrated 
international dispersion of such clusters.  13   
Agglomeration propensities also differ by type of supplier
14. For suppliers of 
standard equipment and components, there is no need for close interaction with their 
customers. Intense interaction is essential however for the client´s relation with high-end 
suppliers of differentiated products that require proprietary technology. Paraphrasing 
price theory terminology, we call these suppliers “technology makers”
15. Now suppose 
the client has established an overseas affiliate in country C. Here again, globalization has 
broadened the co-location options. Interaction does not need to be localized, i.e. it does 
not need to occur on the spot, at the client´s overseas facility in country C. It frequently 
takes place at the client`s or the supplier`s home facilities that often may reside in 
different countries A and B. 
 
 Intense localized interaction (i.e. interaction on the spot) is necessary only for 
newly established and still relatively weak lower-tier suppliers (technology takers) who 
need to be nurtured till they can stand on their own feet. In the electronics industry, for 
instance, technology takers are frequently used as second sources. Their main purpose is 
to provide the client with a price leverage against suppliers who are technology setters 
and  who are inclined to charge premium prices. Technology takers are also used as 
capacity buffers, especially when the technology setters resist client requests for price 
cuts. Divergent agglomeration propensities by type of supplier thus provides us with 
another differentiating factor that shapes distinct development trajectories. 
 
Probably the most important caveat to the agglomeration economies argument is 
that dispersion is no longer restricted to lower-end activities. This becomes clear when we 
look at the role played by GPN as carriers of international knowledge diffusion. 
 
3.  SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION: GLOBAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS AS 
CARRIERS OF KNOWLEDGE DIFFUSION 
 
Geographic dispersion poses increasingly demanding coordination requirements. 
Global production networks (GPN) are an organizational innovation that enables network 
flagships to combine concentrated dispersion with systemic forms of integration. These 
networks integrate  the dispersed supply and customer bases of  a network flagship, i.e. 
its subsidiaries, affiliates and joint ventures, its suppliers and subcontractors, its 
                                                            
14 Williamson´s concept of site specificity, a particular form of physical asset specificity, provides a formal 
treatment of this issue. A fundamental weakness however is the theory´s inherent incapacity to address the 
issue of innovation. As Williamson himself explains:” The introduction of innovation plainly complicates 
the earlier-described assignment of transactions to markets and hierarchies based entirely on an examination 
of their asset specificity qualities. Indeed, the study of economic organization in a regime of rapid 
innovation poses much more difficult issues than those addressed here.” (1985: 143). In the final analysis, 
Williamson`s theory explains the firm as a response to market failure: “The cause of this market failure is 
“asset specificity” - a technological condition that is given to the firm.” (Lazonick, 1999: 22) 
15 Price theory distinguishes perfect competition, where the firm is a “price taker”, i.e. has no choice but to 
accept the price that has been determined in the market, and monopolistic competition, where the 
monopolist can, if so inclined, raise his price (“price maker”).  In analogy, we distinguish “technology 
makers” that possess proprietary technology and hence can shape the design trajectory of a particular 
product or service, and “technology takers” that have no choice but to accept the design principles 
established by the former.  14   
distribution channels and value-added resellers, as well as its R&D alliances and a variety 
of cooperative agreements, such as standards consortia
16. The flagship breaks down the 
value chain into a variety of discrete functions and locates them wherever they can be 
carried out most effectively, where they improve the firm’s access to resources and 
capabilities, and where they are needed to facilitate the penetration of important growth 
markets. Under certain conditions, these networks may enhance the diffusion of 
knowledge across firm boundaries and national borders.  
 
3.1.  Scope of Linkages 
 
One reason to talk about systemic integration
17 is a substantially broadened scope 
for international linkages: a GPN encompasses both intra-firm and inter-firm linkages; 
creates a diversity of network participants; links together multiple locations; and covers a 
variety of value chain stages, including higher-end, and more knowledge-intensive ones. 
 
This raises a number of important issues that are highly contested in the literature. 
For instance, GPN do not necessarily give rise to less hierarchical forms of firm 
organization (as predicted for instance in Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). Network 
participants differ in their access to and in their position within such networks, and hence 
face very different challenges. We use a taxonomy of network participants that 
distinguishes various hierarchical layers that range from flagship companies that 
dominate such networks, down to a variety of usually smaller, local network participants. 
The flagship is at the heart of a network: it provides strategic and organizational 
leadership beyond the resources that, from an accounting perspective, lie directly under 
its management control (Rugman, 1997: 182). 
 
The strategy of the flagship company thus directly affects the growth, the strategic 
direction and network position of lower-end participants, like specialized suppliers and 
subcontractors.. The flagship derives its strength from its control over critical resources 
and capabilities, and from its capacity to coordinate transactions between the different 
network nodes. Both are the sources of its superior capacity for generating economic 
rents
18. This taxonomy helps to distinguish the different capacities of these firms to reap 
                                                            
16 The concept of a global production network (GPN) captures the spread of the value chain across firm 
boundaries and national borders. It may, or may not, involve ownership of equity stakes. For details, see 
e.g., Ernst, 1994b, 1997a, 1997b, 1998, 2000a, 2000c, and 2000d. For empirical case studies on diverse 
GPN, see Ernst and Ravenhill, 1999, and various chapters in Borrus, Ernst and Haggard (eds.), 2000. 
17 Partial integration is characterized by a loose patchwork of arms´-length trade and stand-alone, unrelated 
investment projects. Most of these focus either on access to domestic markets or on exploiting particular 
resources (cheap labor). They are footloose, in the sense that they are prone to rapid closure and   
redeployment. Partial integration implies a limited scope for international specialization. This is due to an 
absence of interactions across functions and locations, and to a lack of coordination. 
18 I refer of course to Penrose-type rents. Spender (1998, p.433) demonstrates that “… each type of 
knowledge can, in principle, be associated with a different kind of rent and competitive advantage.” Tacit 
social knowledge (which Spender calls collective) is of critical importance: “The collective knowledge 
which develops as key players interact under conditions of uncertainty leads to Penrose rents, so labelled 
because such activity-based learning lies at the core of her theory of the growth of the firm.”  15   
potential network benefits, and the institutions and policies required to support weaker 
network participants from developing countries. 
 
One critical capability for instance is the intellectual property and knowledge 
associated with setting, maintaining and continuously upgrading a de facto market 
standard. This requires perpetual improvements in product features, functionality, 
performance, cost and quality. It is such “complementary assets” (Teece, 1986) that the 
flagship increasingly outsources. This has given rise to a number of organizational 
innovations that culminate in the spread of GPN. Take recent developments in the 
electronics industry which has become the most important breeding ground for a New 
Industrial Organization model (e.g., Chandler, et al, 1998). For instance, for a typical 
flagship in the PC business, the cost of components, software and services purchased 
from outside, has increased from less than 60 percent to more than 80 percent of total (ex 
factory) production costs (Ernst and O´Connor, 1992, chapter I). As external sourcing 
relations become geographically dispersed and increasingly complex, they are fraught 
with very high coordination costs: some firms report that the cost of coordinating such 
outside relations can exceed in-house manufacturing costs
19. As a result, the focus of cost 
reduction strategies is shifting from scale economies in manufacturing to a reduction of 
the cost of global sourcing. 
 
In the electronics industry, this has given rise to a proliferation of specialized 
suppliers, segmenting the industry into separate, yet closely interacting horizontal layers 
(Grove, 1996). The initial catalyst was the availability of standard components, which 
allows for a change in computer design away from centralized (IBM mainframe) to 
decentralized architectures (PC, and PC-related networks). As a result, new options 
emerged for outsourcing, transforming an erstwhile vertically integrated industry into 
horizontally disintegrated, yet closely interacting market segments (e.g., integrated 
circuits, board assembly, disk drives, operating systems, applications software, and 
networking equipment).  
 
Each of these individual market segments became rapidly globalized. This has 
given rise to the co-existence of complex, globally organized sector- specific value chains, 
for instance for microprocessors, memories, PCs, HDD, and other components, a process 
accelerated by the introduction of Internet-enabled virtual integration (e.g., Ernst, 2000c). 
Each of these value chains consists of a variety of GPN that compete with each other, but 
that may also cooperate. The number of such networks, and the intensity of competition 
varies across sectors, reflecting their different stage of development and their 
idiosyncratic industry structures. These fundamental changes in the organization of 
international production have been largely neglected in the literature, both in research on 
knowledge spill-overs through FDI, and in research on the internationalization of 
corporate R&D. 
 
                                                            
19 Such costs are typically defined as "... all incremental cost associated with dealing with suppliers remote 
from the initial design site and/or the final assembly site", with communication costs and administrative 
overheads absorbing the largest share (Ernst and O'Connor, 1992, ibid.)  16   
Take the outsourcing of volume manufacturing and related support services that 
enables global brand-name companies in the electronics industry (especially PC and 
telecommunications) to combine cost reduction, product differentiation and time-to-
market (Sturgeon, forthcoming, and Luethje, 1999). A peculiar feature of this new model 
of industrial organization is that manufacturing is de-coupled from product development, 
and is dispersed across firm and national boundaries. With an average annual growth of 
more than 25%, the so-called electronics manufacturing services  (EMS) market is one of 




The network flagship outsources not only manufacturing, but also a variety of 
high-end, knowledge-intensive support services. Most research on the location of 
knowledge-intensive activities has focused on the role of R&D, but this may be a too 
narrow focus ( for details, see Ernst, 2000f). It is necessary to cast the net wider and to 
analyze the geographic dispersion of cross-functional,  knowledge-intensive support 
services that are intrinsically linked with production. Even if these activities do not 
involve formal R&D, they may still give rise to considerable learning and innovation. The 
latter include for instance trial production (prototyping and ramping-up), tooling and 
equipment, benchmarking of productivity, testing, process adaptation, product 
customization and supply chain coordination. 
 
The result is that an increasing share of the value-added becomes dispersed across 
the boundaries of the firm as well as across national borders. Take the spread of "turnkey 
production arrangements" in the PC industry.  A typical example is the contract between 
Taiwan's Mitac International and Compaq: the latter has out-sourced all stages of the 
value chain for a particular PC family, except marketing; and Mitac is responsible for the 
design and development of new products, as well as for manufacturing, transport and 
after-sales services at its manufacturing facilities in Taiwan, China, Britain, Australia and 
the US. For Compaq, Mitac's greatest attraction is its network of plants and sales 
subsidiaries located in most of the world's key computer markets (Ernst, 2000a). What 
matters for our purposes is that Mitac and other smaller Taiwanese companies can use 
such arrangements as a catalyst for upgrading their firm-specific capabilities and their 
collective knowledge base in the Taipei-Hsinchu industrial district. 
 
  This example illustrates a tendency to extend international subcontracting to 
comprise an integrated package of higher-end support services, to be provided by a 
foreign partner. With the exception of hard-core R&D and strategic marketing that remain 
under the control of the network flagship, the supplier must be able to shoulder all steps 
in the value chain. In some cases, it must even take on the coordination functions 
necessary for global supply chain management. This necessitates dense linkages between 
                                                            
20 The role model for such changes is Solectron that, only a few years ago was a typical SME, but has 
transformed itself into the world´s largest EMS provider. With a CAGR of 43% over the past five years,  
Solectron has now more than 46,000 employees in 41 locations worldwide, with more than 9 million square 
feet of capacity. Revenues for FY 1999 were $ 8.4 billion.  17   
geographically dispersed, yet concentrated and locally specialized clusters, and their 
integration into GPN. 
 
3.2. Intensity of Linkages 
 
Systemic integration also implies that linkages between any two countries A and 
B are no longer secondary, quasi optional to their domestic linkages. Instead, existing 
clusters in both countries supplement each other and may experience mutual inter-
penetration. Under such conditions, international linkages are essential for the continuous 
growth of specialized cluster. 
 
This is self-evident for network suppliers, especially lower-tier ones, whose 
growth and strategic direction is heavily determined by the network flagship. Dependence 
however also works the other way round. To the degree that the flagship has moved to 
global sourcing, it may no longer have any credible domestic suppliers. This implies an 
erosion   of the collective knowledge which used to be a characteristic feature of the 
flagship´s home location. In some cases, that collective knowledge may have migrated for 
good to the supplier`s overseas cluster(s).  
 
The semiconductor industry provides a typical example (Ernst, 1983 and 1997b, 
chapter IV). Since the 1970s, leading American producers had moved much of their final 
assembly and testing to Asia, with the result that knowledge had to follow suit. Take the 
case of Texas Instruments: "As far as assembly and testing are concerned we have more 
expertise here (i.e. in Malaysia) than we have in the U.S.. We sometimes have to send our 
Malaysian engineers to the States to solve their problems."
21 In the case of Intel's Penang 
subsidiary, such expertise became particularly strong for the design and production of 
specialized automated assembly equipment. When Intel, in 1983, set up highly automated 
assembly plants in Chandler/Arizona and in Ireland, the company had to rely on senior 
Malaysian engineers from its Penang affiliate for plant lay-out, equipment design, as well 
as for sorting out technical teething problems
22. Intel Penang even claims that the first 
manager of its Mechanisation and Automation group has been seconded to automate 
Intel's wafer fabrication lines in the United States and that its automation team makes 
substantial contributions to upgrade the level of automation in Intel's worldwide 
operations.  
 
Over time, much of this knowledge has moved out of individual subsidiaries and 
has become widely diffused across different network nodes, especially in East Asia. The 
irony is that, today, chip assembly is no longer the uninspiring "back-end" of the 
semiconductor industry. Assembly and packaging technologies in this industry have 
become highly complex and play an important role for yields and performance features of 
leading-edge devices. Knowledge diffusion through GPN has enabled chip contract 
assemblers in Korea (e.g., Anam Industrial, the world's largest IC contract assembler 
being a prime example), Taiwan, and Singapore to accumulate design capabilities for 
                                                            
21 Author's interview at Texas Instruments Malaysia, May 1984 
22 Author´s  interview at Intel Penang (April 1992).  18   
innovative new circuit packaging technologies. This has provided ample opportunities for 
the development of local SME-based clusters that support chip assembly. 
 
3.2.  New Opportunities for International Knowledge Diffusion   
 
We have seen that the main purpose of GPN is to gain quick access to lower-cost 
foreign capabilities that are complementary to the flagship´s own competencies. To 
mobilize and harness these external capabilities, flagships are forced to accept a certain 
dispersion of the value chain. They also must broaden their capability transfer to 
individual nodes of their GPN. The (often unintended) result is a creeping diffusion of 
knowledge to external actors abroad. This opens new opportunities for international 
knowledge linkages that developing countries should strive to exploit. It however also 
raises complex challenges for policies as well as firm organization
23. 
 
A GPN can create a virtuous circle of international knowledge diffusion for two 
reasons. First, it increases the length of a firm's value chain, as well as its logistical 
complexity. This creates new gaps and interstices that can be addressed by small, 
specialized suppliers. While in some cases (like for instance “screw-driver” contract 
assembly), such entry may be short-lived, this is not necessarily so. Outsourcing 
requirements have become more demanding and have forced specialized suppliers to 
develop their capabilities. Over time, they may be able to upgrade their position from 
simple contract manufacturers to providers of integrated service packages, and hence 
increase the benefits that they can reap from network participation.  
 
A typical example is Solectron, the world´s largest electronics manufacturing 
services company that we mentioned before. Founded in 1977 as a tiny contract 
manufacturer of electronic controllers for solar energy equipment, it only began to grow 
once it moved into circuit board assembly for the PC industry, acting as a low-cost buffer 
for the periodic capacity deficits of large electronics equipment producers. Given the low 
entry barriers of this business, this market was soon inundated with lower-cost 
competitors. Competitive survival required a focus on quality and speed, necessitating 
substantial investments in assembly automation (surface-mount-technology), leading-
edge process technology, and training. This high-risk strategy paid off, as it allowed 
Solectron to move up the ladder in the contractor hierarchy and to a become a preferred 
supplier of leading electronics companies. This in turn required investments in overseas 
facilities (geographic dispersion) to provide manufacturing and design services where 
required. Since the late 1990s, the company has further upgraded its capabilities. It 
defines itself now as a global supply chain facilitator: “…customers can turn to Solectron 
at any stage of the supply chain, anywhere in the world, and get the highest-quality, most 
flexible solutions to optimize their existing supply chains (Solectron, 2000: 1).  
 
Second, once a network supplier successfully upgrades its capabilities, this creates 
further pressure for a continuous migration of knowledge-intensive, higher value-added 
                                                            
23 Part  4 addresses policy implications for developing countries, while management implications are 
explored in Ernst (2000d)  19   
support activities to individual network nodes. This may also include engineering, 
product and process development. This reflects the increasingly demanding competitive 
requirements. In the electronics industry for instance, product-life-cycles have been cut to 
six months, and sometimes less (Ernst, 1998). Overseas production thus frequently occurs 
soon after the launching of new products. This is only possible if key design information 
is shared more freely between the network flagship and its overseas affiliates and 
suppliers. Speed-to-market requires that engineers across the different nodes of a GPN are 





Important constraints exist to the diffusion of knowledge within GPN. Of 
particular importance are changes in organizational routines that result from geographic 
dispersion. Once a network flagship extends its value chain across national boundaries, it 
is faced with complex coordination problems and the risk of abrupt disruptions. Four 
sources of disruption can be discerned: (1) those caused by suppliers, either through late 
delivery or through the delivery of defective materials; (2) unforeseen fluctuations in 
demand and abrupt changes in demand patterns; (3) a variety of production problems that 
result from the transfer of immature products and production processes: and (4) abrupt 
changes in management decisions, for instance last-minute corrections of product launch 
dates and performance features.  
 
  Flagships have tried to reduce the likelihood of such disruptions - yet so far with 
only limited success (Levy, 1995). While production-related disruptions decline with 
increasing product maturity, this has not been the case for demand-related disruptions and 
for abrupt changes in management decisions that have been imposed by financial 
markets. On both counts, the geographic dispersion of GPN has considerably increased 
the pace of change and uncertainty. This poses increasingly complex trade-offs between 
specialization advantages from geographic dispersion and the dynamic benefits from 
learning and innovation. Coping with these trade-offs requires far-reaching changes in 
existing organizational structures. This has given rise to a debate about how firms can 
improve corporate coherence, as more and more value chain activities migrate to external 
actors (Teece, Rumelt, Dosi and Winter, 1994).  
 
Another constraint to the diffusion of knowledge within GPN are differences in 
the approach to knowledge creation. It has been argued that peculiar features of national 
institutions have led to distinctive national approaches of firms to learning and knowledge 
formation and that this constrains knowledge sharing and inter-organizational learning 
across national borders (Lam, 1998). The dominant form of knowledge held in 
organizations, its degree of tacitness, and the way in which it is structured, utilized and 
transmitted can vary considerably between firms in different societies. This reflects 
differences in social institutions, especially with regard to knowledge formation, labour 
markets and occupational systems.  
  20   
Knowledge outsourcing through GPN thus requires lengthy trial-and-error 
learning processes and substantial investment to strengthen the  absorptive capacity of 
different network nodes and participants. This implies that network flagships may now 
have a vested interest in the formation of regional clusters of specialized capabilities that 
are located within or in close proximity to their main growth markets. This has important 
implications for developing countries, to which we now turn. 
 
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
For developing countries, integration into GPN poses a fundamental dilemma. An 
increased mobility of firm-specific resources and capabilities may enhance the diffusion 
of knowledge across firm boundaries and national borders, and hence provide new 
opportunities for development strategies. Nothing however guarantees this outcome. 
Network integration may equally well may erode a country´s sources of competitive 
advantage. It may also erode the strengths of existing clusters. This may increase the 
divide between firms and districts that have and those that do not have access to the 
information and knowledge that is necessary to reap the benefits of network participation. 
Many people are understandably concerned that this may lead to a decline in economic 
growth and welfare.  
 
4.1. Opportunities: the Dual Nature of Knowledge Outsourcing 
 
There is however cause for cautious optimism: network participation may provide 
new opportunities for reverse knowledge outsourcing for firms and industrial districts in 
developing countries. Our analysis has shown that GPN are powerful vehicles for 
knowledge outsourcing across firm boundaries and national borders. It is important to 
emphasize its dual nature. Most debates focus on the strategic rationale underlying 
knowledge outsourcing by large global network flagship companies, and their 
organizational implications (e.g., Patel and Pavitt, 1991; and Granstrand et al, 1993.). For 
developing countries however what matters is the other side of the coin: participation in 
GPN can facilitate reverse  knowledge outsourcing by smaller, lower-tier network 
participants that may help them to overcome some of their knowledge-related 
disadvantages.  
 
Three effects of such reverse knowledge outsourcing can be distinguished: First, it 
can act as a conduit for knowledge diffusion for state-of-the-art management approaches 
as well as product and process technologies. At the same time, these international 
linkages can also act as catalysts for knowledge creation and capability development 
within firms and industrial districts in developing countries. Thirdly, over time these 
linkages may also give rise to joint knowledge creation, with roughly symmetrical 
contributions from the global network flagship and from the developing country network 
participants.  
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Take the participation of Taiwanese computer firms in GPN (Ernst, 2000a). Let us 
look at the most important of such linkages, i.e. manufacturing on an OEM basis
24. 
Taiwan´s involvement in the OEM business has gone through different incarnations, from 
very simple arrangements to highly complex ones. Each of these stages has given rise to a 
peculiar pattern of knowledge outsourcing. It started with very simple OEM arrangements 
covering low-end desktop PCs and labor-intensive peripherals that generated limited 
opportunities for knowledge outsourcing. In response to such draw-backs, some 
Taiwanese computer companies have tried to move up into own brand-name 
manufacturing (OBM) sales. Most of them failed and are now content to consolidate and 
upgrade their position as OEM suppliers. Paradoxically, this increasing reliance on OEM 
arrangements has had positive effects for knowledge creation in Taiwan´s computer 
industry. In contrast to a widespread perception (e.g., Hobday, 1995), successful 
knowledge outsourcing does not necessarily require a sequential move from OEM, up to 
ODM, and then further up to OBM. Instead, Taiwanese suppliers were able to learn and 
to create knowledge through concurrent implementation of these different knowledge 
outsourcing approaches.  
 
It is important to emphasize the diversity of such linkages and their non-linear 
evolutionary character. International linkages include a variety of ties with sales, 
manufacturing, and engineering support affiliates of foreign firms; they also include 
different forms and trajectories of integration into global production networks (GPN). 
Taiwanese firms for instance have typically pursued different approaches in parallel, 
rather than concentrating exclusively on one particular linkage. It is through such 
concurrent and multiple linkages that a virtuous circle between knowledge outsourcing 
and knowledge creation becomes feasible. 
 
4.2. Challenges that Define the Need for Public Policy Response 
 
To reap the benefits of network participation, developing countries must broaden 
their domestic knowledge base and generate specialized capabilities. This cannot be left 
to market forces alone. Markets are notoriously weak in generating knowledge and 
capabilities, as both are subject to externalities: investments are typically characterized by 
a gap between private and social rates of return (K. Arrow,1962). Reducing this gap 
requires corrective policy interventions that provide incentives, as well as the necessary 
infrastructure, support services and human resources.  
 
While the neo-classical concept of “market failure” provides a rationale for policy 
intervention, it is of limited value for designing its contents (Lipsey, in this issue). A 
fundamental weakness of this concept is its general equilibrium assumption: defined as a 
                                                            
24 Definitions of what constitutes an OEM (original equipment manufacturing) contract keep changing. 
Probably the most widely accepted definition refers to arrangements between a brand name company (the 
network flagship) and the contractor (the supplier) where the customer provides detailed technical 
blueprints and most of the components to allow the contractor to produce according to specifications. Using 
this definition of OEM arrangements, we can then distinguish ODM (original design manufacturing) as 
arrangements where the contractor is responsible for design and most of the component procurement, with 
the brand name company retaining exclusive control over marketing.   22   
deviation from the market clearing equilibrium under conditions of perfect competition, 
the remedy is to return to a theoretically achievable static optimum. It is now well 
accepted that perfect competition hardly ever reigns in markets that characterize modern 
industry. It is thus misleading to think of market failure as something that can, or should, 
be `remedied` so that the economy can be brought back to a desired static optimum  
 
In any case, this concept is patently inappropriate for defining the agenda for 
public policy response in the context of rapid technological change (such as ICT) and 
globalization. Both accelerate the pace of change in markets and technology and increase 
uncertainty and the volatility of market structures, industrial organization and firm 
behavior (e.g., Ernst, 2000c). Equally important, almost all aspects of knowledge creation 
and learning are characterized by market failure: this is true for information and codified 
knowledge, and even more so for tacit knowledge. Information/codified knowledge is 
difficult to trade in a market: whenever information is imperfect, “externalities” diffuse 
and markets incomplete, which is invariably the case with technical change, free markets 
cannot in principle meet the strict requirements of optimal resource allocation (Stiglitz, 
1998). And “… tacit knowledge is plain market failure in the sense that it cannot, as such, 
be transacted in the market.” (Lundvall and Borras, 1997: 49).  
 
The result is that there is now a much greater need for public policy that goes well 
beyond the “market failure” rationale. This does not imply a return to the status quo ante 
of the strong developmental state (as suggested for instance by  Wade & Veneroso, 1998). 
The challenge is to redefine the role of government intervention (Rodrik, 2000). The real 
question, then, is no longer whether national policies and institutions can make a 
difference. Instead, it is what kind of policies and institutions will prove most conducive 
for unlocking new sources of economic growth. 
 
4.3. The New Agenda: Industrial Upgrading through International Linkages 
 
Coping with these new opportunities and challenges is simply not possible as long 
as development strategies continue to stick to the old recipes. Fundamental changes are 
overdue. Talking about such changes is no longer taboo. After decades of exposure to 
liberalization, earlier naiv expectations are now being challenged by a more realistic 
definition of the policy agenda. A consensus is emerging in Latin America, the ex-Soviet 
bloc, and (since 1997) also in Asia: it is no longer possible to assume that a passive 
reliance on foreign capital and technology inflows guarantees sustainable industrial 
upgrading. In brackets, one may add that such debates are also high on the agenda in 
major OECD countries. Earlier assumptions and prescriptions need to be reconsidered. 
 
Of course, nothing goes without a consolidation of the financial sector that 
reduces the vulnerability of volatile international capital. Equally obvious is the need for 
reforms of public as well as corporate governance that improve transparency, reducing the 
likelihood of moral hazards. There is also no doubt that this needs to be combined with 
cost-cutting and a reduction of surplus capacity in key sectors. But, and this is a big BUT, 
very different approaches are possible to financial and governance reforms and to  23   
corporate restructuring. Much depends on how one defines the long-term development 
model.  
 
The concept of “industrial upgrading” (IU) can serve as a focusing device. This 
concept has recently gained acceptance among economists who are interested in 
identifying new sources of growth, both in industrialized and in developing countries. It 
attempts to model the link between innovation, specialization and Hirschmann-type 
linkages (“industrial deepening”), and possible consequences for economic growth 
through induced improvements in productivity. All four elements are essential 
prerequisites for improving a country´s capacity to raise patient capital that is necessary 
for facility investment, R&D, human resource development and welfare expenditures.  
 
This requires a development model that focuses on knowledge and innovation as 
major sources of economic growth. This is in line with the leading-edge in economic 
theorizing, such as endogenous growth theories (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 
1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992, and Helpman, 1998); Lipsey`s structuralist growth 
theory (Lipsey, 1997; Lipsey, Bekar and Carlaw, 1998 a and b); evolutionary economics 
(e.g., Penrose, 1959/1995; Richardson, 1960/1990; Nelson and Winter, 1982); and 
attempts to reunite economic growth and innovation theory and business history (e.g., 
Lazonick, 1999).  
 
Industrial upgrading essentially implies that a country shifts to higher value-added 
products and production stages through increasing specialization: the more a country 
focuses on higher-end, knowledge-intensive products and support services, the more it is 
expected to experience sustainable export growth and increasing export revenues. 
Drawing on Chenery (1960), Chenery and Syrquin (1975) and Ozawa (2000: 2-3), one 
can construct a taxonomy that distinguishes four forms of IU (Ernst, 2000, SSRC): 
 
•  inter-industry upgrading with capital and technology deepening within a 
hierarchy of industries that proceeds from low value-added industries (e.g., light 
industries) to higher-value added industries (heavy and higher-tech industries);  
• inter-factorial  upgrading within a hierarchy of factors of production that 
proceeds  from “endowed assets” or “natural capital” ( natural resources and unskilled 
labor) to “created assets”, i.e. “physical capital”, “human capital” (specialized skills), and 
“social capital” ( a region`s support services);  
•  upgrading of demand within a hierarchy of consumption, that proceeds from 
“necessities” to “conveniencies”, to “luxury goods; and  
•  upgrading along functional activities within a hierarchy of value-chain stages, 
that proceeds from sales & distribution to final assembly and testing, to component 
manufacturing, system integration, and knowledge-intensive support services. 
 
Most research has focused on a combination of the first two forms of IU, based on 
a distinction between low-wage, low-skill sun-set industries and high-wage, high-skill  24   
sunrise industries. Such simple dichotomies however have failed to produce convincing 
results, for two reasons: First, there are low-wage, low-skill value stages in even the most 
high-tech industry, and high-wage, high-skill activities exist even in so-called traditional 
industries like textiles (e.g., Ernst, Ganiatsos and Mytelka, 1998). Second, both the 
capability requirements and the boundaries of a particular “industry” keep changing over 
time, which makes an analytical focus on the industry level even more problematic. 
 
We define IU as a broadening  and  deepening of a country`s product 
specialization. Both necessitate a strong domestic knowledge base. A broadening 
specialization stands for a move to higher-end and increasingly complex product groups. 
This can happen within a given industry, but it can also involve an extension beyond 
industry boundaries. A deepening specialization stands for the creation of forward and 
backward linkages, and the strengthening of knowledge-intensive and higher value-added 
stages. Our analysis focuses on the determinants of firm behavior, simply because these 
are the main actors in the game. There is a growing consensus that industry structure is 
insufficient to explain the dynamics of innovation, and that firm behavior (organization 
and strategy) has an important bearing on the strength as well as the kinds of innovation 
activity (Teece, 1998: 134). It is also necessary to move beyond the internalist bias that 
characterizes much of the literature on industrial organization and the theory of the firm. 
Policies thus need to consider the sources of innovation and growth in a broader frame of 
reference that extends between the boundaries of the firm. 
 
  Most importantly, we do not share the assumption that IU ends at the national 
border, and that it occurs only if improved specialization generates pressures to create 
dense forward and backward linkages within the economy. This assumption is 
problematic, to the degree that globalization and IT increase the scope for cross-border 
forward and backward linkages. As argued in this paper, this is precisely what is 
happening as a result of the spread of GPN. This obviously raises important issues for the 
industrial upgrading agenda, especially in small nations that heavily depend on 
international trade and investment. But this is true even for a large, quasi-continental 
economies like the U.S., Brazil, China or India. In all of these countries, the importance 
of knowledge outsourcing through international linkages has drastically increased, hence 
internationalizing forward and backward linkages.  
 
In short, while the first priority needs to be a continuous upgrading of the 
domestic innovation systems, this needs to be complemented with a variety of 
international linkages. This is a necessary caveat to Rodrik`s otherwise refreshing 
statement that it is domestic investment that makes an economy grow, not integration into 
the global economy (Rodrik, 1999, p. 16). After all, investment is only half of the story; it 
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4.4. Policy Implications  
 





Drawing on Evans (1995), once can construct a taxonomy of four roles of public 
policy in industrial development:  (i) the  “custodian” role in which the state regulates the 
market, generally privileging the policing function over promotional policies; (ii) the 
"demiurge" in which the state plays an entrepreneurial role, not just to provide public 
goods but out of a presumption that private capital is not adequate to attain the whole 
gamut of production; (iii) “midwifery” where instead of substituting for the private sector 
the state tries to shape it out of a belief that the capacity of the private sector is malleable 
and (iv) “husbandry” in which the state takes a long term view by recognizing that even if 
it successfully induces private groups to tackle promising sectors in its role of midwife, 
this is only just the beginning of a long process of industrial upgrading. As globalization 
poses new opportunities and challenges that local firms are ill-equipped to address on 
their own, public policy must continue to cajole and assist these firms by signaling 
opportunities, reducing risks, engaging in R&D etc.  
 
It follows from our earlier discussion of the transformations imposed by GPN on 
the geography of innovation systems that very limited scope exists for the custodian and 
the demiurge role of public policy. The challenge is to design policies and institutions that 
allow to combine midwifery and husbandry. This implies that the key to success is to 
“catalyze, not replace, the private sector” (McKendrick et al, 2000, chapter 10, p.21) and 
to monitor and to hold firms accountable for their use of incentives and subsidies. Once 
the initial catching-up phase is over, equal treatment should be provided to domestic and 
foreign firms, subject however to one important exception: the promotion of risk-taking 
and innovative smaller companies (e.g., Ernst, 2000a). 
 
Globalization, paradoxically enough, has increased the necessity of such policies. 
But there is also now more space for national policy and politics to vary and to make a 
difference. A growing body of research on economic policy-making in advanced 
industrial countries has demonstrated that choice is possible, in terms of institutions and 
policy instruments, and that this applies to macro-economic policy-making as well as to 
industrial and technology policies (e.g. Berger and Dore (eds.), 1996). The same is true 
for developing countries. 
 
There is now a growing consensus that liberalization of trade and investment 
flows should not be equalized with a retreat of the state (e.g., Rodrik, 1999; UNCTAD, 
1999, WIR). Liberalization needs to be complemented with proactive and sophisticated 
industrial, innovation and investment policies. Without such policies, it may well produce 
negative results: instead of improving allocative efficiency and growth, liberalization may 
increase a country’s vulnerability to highly volatile international finance and currency  26   
markets; and it may divert attempts to strengthen local capabilities and innovation. As the 
example of small Nordic countries and the Netherlands demonstrate, the scope for pro-
active technology and industrial policies in a liberal ownership regime is far greater than 
commonly assumed. Taiwan, Singapore and recent developments in Korea also illustrate 
that a variety of approaches is possible to such policies, involving a variety of interesting 




The following generic principles can help to delineate key components of such 
policies. There is a broad consensus that monetary and macroeconomic stability is of the 
essence to provide appropriate incentives for investment and innovation. These 
fundamentals are a necessary, but not sufficient condition for economic growth. Equally 
important are sector-specific policies that take into account the peculiar requirements of 
particular industries, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of sectoral production, 
support and innovation systems. This is inevitable in any economy where markets are 
based on a sophisticated social division of labor.  
 
Such policies however differ significantly from sector to sector, in scope, in kind, 
and in impact, as documented in Mowery and Nelson (1999: 377). They also differ across 
countries. For instance, there is now less resistance to the idea that direct support via 
protectionism and subsidies can help to promote effective catching-up in DCs (e.g., 
Stopford, 1997). There is also agreement that the value of these policies becomes 
doubtful, once a country has reached the limits of catching-up. In short, there is no one 
best optimal solution; rather, such policies are context-specific; they also need to be 
adjusted over time. 
 
A third important generic policy principle is that competition policy is of critical 
importance (e.g., OECD, 1999b and 2000; Mowery  and Nelson, 1999): firms will only 
invest in productivity-enhancing technology, learning and innovation if competition and 
regulatory reform force them to do so. It has been argued for instance that the relatively 
stringent postwar competition policy of the U.S. weakened the ability of incumbents in 
such industries as computers and semiconductors to control new technologies and 
markets, and hence facilitated new market entry (e.g., Langlois and Steinmueller, 1999). 
This is contrasted with much less aggressive competition policies in Europe and Japan 
which has left incumbents in control of the development of new technologies, yet often at 
a much slower pace. Competition may also help to lower costs, say access charges for 
telecommunications and internet services - a key factor in the diffusion of knowledge 
(OECD, 2000).  
 
Competition however is only part of the story - it needs to be balanced with the 
requirements of IU. Intellectual property rights provides an example. Initially, liberal 
cross-licensing and weak IPR may be required to facilitate knowledge diffusion. Yet, 
once catching-up has been achieved, the pendulum may swing in the opposite direction,  27   
with strict IPR enforcement gaining in importance. Equally important are policies that 
provide support for innovation and for the rapid diffusion of knowledge.  
 
Fourth, implementing such policies however poses daunting political and 
administrative challenges. Combining liberalization with the development of a robust 
national innovation system (NIS) requires fundamental changes in the objectives and 
policy instruments, and a deep understanding of the global competitive dynamics. Not 
less, but actually more knowledge and expertise are required in the public sector. More 
specifically, developing a viable NIS requires a deep understanding of sectoral 
specificities, rather than a sector-neutral and minimally active policy stance. It requires an 
understanding of the widely varying technological properties of specific industries, the 
logistical and strategic concerns of multinational businesses, the fundamental 
transformations in the organization of their global production networks, and the rapidly 
evolving international investment environment. 
 
Finally, organizational and policy innovations are critical for reaping the benefits 
of globalization. So far, such innovations have taken place primarily in the private sector: 
under pressure to cope with globalization, a handful of MNEs and financial firms are 
pioneers in organizational innovations; such innovations however are patently absent in 
the public sector. For developing countries, the challenge is to learn from these 
organizational innovations introduced in the private sector, and to use them to improve 
the efficiency in public institutions and government policies. This does not imply that one 
subscribes to the ideological prescriptions of neo-liberalism: the underlying rationale in 




A central proposition of this paper is that the spread of GPN has substantially 
enhanced the scope for international knowledge diffusion. This implies that it would be 
anachronistic to stick to “go-it-alone” development strategies. Of critical importance is an 
openness to foreign ideas and knowledge, and a capacity to absorb these and blend them 
with existing capabilities. International knowledge linkages can help to broaden the range 
of options. This is especially true for developing countries where the best policies on 
paper are useless if weak institutions prevent their effective implementation. The 
dynamics of change adds additional requirements. Policies and support institutions need 
to be adjusted to frequently unpredictable changes in technology and markets. There is no 
“one-size-fits-all” approach to policies and institution-building: both need to be context-
specific and open to continuous adjustment. Hence, the critical importance of diversity, 
flexibility and adaptability in both policy instruments and institutions. Here again, an 
international perspective can help. 
 
One important reason for international cooperation is that a national system might 
be locked into paths that are sub-optimal. The sharing of knowledge between actors of 
different national systems of innovation (NIS) may increase the chances to pursue more 
potential options, and hence to reduce the lock-in risk. But there is a more fundamental  28   
reason: the de facto internationalization of local capability clusters and industrial districts 
through GPN. Rather than denying this, it is better to try to shape this process. NIS can no 
longer exist in splendid isolation: they need to open up and internationalize.  
 
This requires a progressive internationalization of public R&D institutions and 
knowledge service providers. Take the example of the Fraunhofer Society (FhG), a key 
component of Germany`s NIS: over the last years, FhG has established overseas affiliates 
in world excellence centres (example: graphic data processing in the US) as well as in 
potential markets for German technology (i.e., Malaysia). This needs to be complemented 
with policies that help to improve the absorptive capacity of an NIS, i.e. its ability to tap 
into sources of knowledge world-wide and to pass relevant knowledge quickly on to 
domestic industries. The focus should be on the rapid application of new knowledge.  
 
Equally important are policies that induce global network flagships to locate 
relatively knowledge-intensive activities to create dynamic clusters (e.g., Best, 1999), and 
to continuously upgrade these activities. At present, there is a mismatch between the 
location decision criteria used by network flagships and policy debates on what 
constitutes an optimal location. Policies must be adapted to the important changes in firm 
behavior that we have described in this paper. Locational debates must shift from an 
exclusive concern with costs (static efficiency) to the development of specialized 
capability clusters (dynamic efficiency based on dense forward and backward linkages). 
In principle, an optimal location would combine attractive lead markets, a highly 
developed production structure (supply base) and excellent research conditions. But very 
few locations can fulfil all three criteria simultaneously.  
 
A lack of world-leading R&D excellence centres does not necessarily disqualify a 
country/region/location from participating in a GPN. The experience of East Asia 
demonstrates that the development of a competitive production base can be a good 
starting-point. Over time, this needs to be complemented however with the development 
of lead markets and a gradual improvement of R&D capabilities. These are essential 
requirements for industrial upgrading.  
 
Globalization however also raises a fundamental dilemma. On the one hand some 
degree of stability must exist in policies and institutions: without such stability it is very 
difficult to mobilize resources and to provide incentives for learning and innovation. On 
the other hand, globalization, combined with ICT, imposes disruptive changes on the very 
same institutions and policies. While the latter may have been successful during certain 
periods, for instance for rapid catching-up, they may well become barriers at a later stage. 
Any attempt to preserve the status quo ante of institutions and policies in the context of 
rapid change and increasing uncertainty is likely to constrict learning and innovation that 
are necessary for industrial upgrading.  
 
In short, continuity needs to be combined with continuous adaptation in 
institutions and policies. It is obviously very difficult to achieve the right balance. Change 
however should be constrained by the need to build on accumulated capabilities. “Big  29   
Bang” change, which discards the latter, often involves prohibitively high opportunity 
costs; it may also destroy social consensus, i.e. the most fundamental prerequisite for 
economic development.  
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